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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2539 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER RAD, 
 
                                       Appellant 
     
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  3-11-cr-00161-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
     
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)  
March 3, 2104 
 
(Opinion filed: March 14, 2014) 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
On appeal, Christopher Rad urges that the District Court denied him a fair trial by 
misinterpreting the CAN-SPAM Act and preventing his counsel from properly defending 
his case by “changing the rules” of the trial during the trial.  (Appellant’s Br. at 27.) 
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 Rad was on trial for alleged securities fraud and illegal spamming.
1
  The 
complicated nature of the scheme is detailed in the Government’s brief but is not material 
to this appeal.  What is material is that the defense took the position at trial that if a 
person who received the emails that Rad sent had “opted-in,” i.e. consented to receive 
emails, they would not fall within the definition of “commercial electronic mail” under 
the civil provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act, because they were “transactional or 
relationship” messages, and thus not unlawful.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7702(2)(A)-(B).   During 
the trial, the District Court ruled that opting-in did not convert the message into a 
“transactional or relationship” message, and so instructed the jury. 
 The difficulty with Rad’s argument on appeal is that he essentially urges that he 
was prejudiced because the Government did not object to this incorrect statement of the 
law earlier in the trial, so that he continued to pursue a flawed defense.  He also urges that 
he was prejudiced by the District Court’s allowing him pursue his incorrect theory early 
in the trial, only later telling the jury that it was not correct and should be disregarded.  
Counsel urges that the jury should have decided whether the opt-ins were “transactional 
or relationship email” messages, but the Court ruled that there was no basis in the record 
for the jury to consider that issue.
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1
 Specifically, Rad was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud, under 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, as well as conspiracy to falsify header information in multiple 
emails, under 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(3).   Rad was also charged with multiple substantive 
violations of the CAN-SPAM Act, for illegal spamming, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1037(a)(1)- 
(4). 
2
 The Court specifically stated in part, “there is no transaction that [the recipients] entered 
into with . . . Mr. Rad, for that matter, or any of the securities which were being discussed 
in the particular e-mails.”2  (App. 188.)   
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 In his brief, Rad explains his “position” regarding the applicability of the 
exclusion based on the recipients’ “opt-in” status: “it was Mr. Rad’s position that as far as 
he knew or requested, all e-mails were sent only to persons who had opted in to receive 
information about stocks, and thus there was a ‘relationship’ between such opt-ins and 
the mailers of the stock information.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 31-32.)  Specifically, Rad 
claimed that as certain of his compatriots purchased, from a third party, lists of email 
addresses of people who sought stock information, such people had therefore “opted-in” 
to the receipt of his emails. 
 Noticeably lacking from Rad’s brief, however, is any support in law for the notion 
that someone who agreed to receive an email therefore had a “relationship” with the 
eventual mailer.  The statutory definition of a “transactional or relationship” message that 
Rad references requires that the primary purpose of the communication is to deliver 
goods or services “that the recipient is entitled to receive under the terms of a transaction 
that the recipient has previously agreed to enter into with the sender.” 15 U.S.C. § 
7702(17)(A)(v).  Rad fails to see the disconnect between the recipient’s having opted-in 
to receive information, versus a recipient’s receiving a follow-up good or service 
pursuant to the terms of a previous transaction with the sender.
3
  Rad has never indicated 
– either before the District Court or on appeal – that any previous transactions had ever 
taken place between any of the recipients and the sender(s) of the spam at issue; indeed 
there were none. 
                                              
3
 The other potentially applicable definition of transactional or relationship emails, 15 
U.S.C. § 7702(17)(A)(i), also contains the requirement of a prior transaction with the 
sender. 
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 Further, Rad’s alleged lack of a fair trial was due not to any dilatory conduct on 
the part of the Government in not objecting at the first possible moment during the trial, 
nor to the District Court’s appropriate ruling that the defense theory was a misstatement 
of the law.  Rather, the trial proceeded as it did with the resulting need for defense 
counsel to abandon one of his arguments, because he chose a line of defense that was 
lacking in support, as a matter of law, so as to be misleading to the jury.  The District 
Court had every right to prevent this.  The Government urges that the fact that the ruling 
was belated was a result of defense counsel’s failure to test his theory in pretrial motions.  
We agree. 
 In any event, Rad did not object to the supposedly delayed nature of the ruling and 
curative instruction by the District Court.  Accordingly, his claim of a due process 
violation on that ground is reviewed for plain error.  Because the District Court did not 
err, let alone plainly, Rad’s claim fails.  We reach a similar conclusion as to Rad’s claim 
that a mistrial should have been declared once one of the defense arguments was deemed 
not credible.  (Appellant’s Br. at 35.)  Rad never requested a mistrial and the District 
Court did not commit plain error in allowing the trial to proceed.  
 In sum, Rad erroneously interpreted the CAN-SPAM Act at trial and continues to 
advance the same mistaken argument on appeal.  He has also failed to show that he was 
denied a fair trial.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
